Constructive Sovereignty: The Cases of Thailand and Burma

Introduction

In this study I investigate the linkage between the collective preferences of the Thai people and Thailand’s foreign policy. For purposes of comparison, I also examine Burma for the same linkage. I chose to compare Thailand with Burma because even though the two states looked very much alike a century ago, they are very different today. My research question is very simply why? What explains the two states extreme departure from the similarities they shared only a century ago? My hypothesis is that both the structural and institutional variables normally employed to explain this phenomenon were shaped by the collective preferences of the Thai people. It is my goal to demonstrate a causal relationship between the preferences of each state’s respective domestic population and its foreign policy.

The theoretical lens used in this paper is constructive sovereignty, an international relations model intended to address how states internationalize, each at it its own pace, while still maintaining sovereignty. The constructive sovereignty model recognizes the state as the highest authority, but maintains that states are not the primary actors, their constituents are. Therefore, state preferences are not fixed. Since states merely represent the preferences of their constituents, they will only adhere to and ultimately embed those international norms that their respective constituencies accept (this process is often lengthy and very slow). The model posits that, rather than depend upon international organizations to impose global norms from the outside in, change must ultimately come from the inside out. As domestic populations become more international in their mind set, they will become more receptive to international norms; and they will voice their acceptance of those norms both politically and especially as consumers.

It is therefore a central assumption of the model that privatization is not only the driving force behind globalization, but also that private enterprise possesses the incentive to implement those international norms reflected in the preferences of consumers (profit). Private enterprise is also the primary consumer of proprietary data used to measure the preferences of consumers, and as such remains the most up-to-date source of changing consumer preferences. As private enterprise meets the increasingly international demands of consumers, it will itself become more international in scope, and the cycle is self-perpetuating. In this way international norms are embedded and viewed with legitimacy by each state's constituency, while state sovereignty is maintained and respected.

Constructive sovereignty does not assume state borders are permanent, as the notion of the nation-state itself is a construction. The model does, however, assume that state borders do ultimately reflect the collective preferences of the domestic populations residing within. Furthermore, the model assumes that this self-determination has substantial impact on a state’s domestic and foreign policy.
In the pages that follow, I will discuss the evolution of the modern state of Burma, paying close attention to the many cycles of conquest and fragmentation in an endless attempt to politically unify this ethnically divided state. Following the discussion of Burma I will offer a similar treatment of Thailand. In my discussion of Thailand, I will pay somewhat less attention to the details of its history and focus more on the overall policy of assimilation and cooption pursued by the Thai state. After considering some commonly offered explanations for Thailand’s relative openness and Burma’s isolation, I apply the constructive sovereignty model to the two states and arrive at the conclusion that it is the level of internationalization of each state’s domestic population that is crucial to explaining the difference between contemporary Thailand and contemporary Burma; a finding that is generalizable to other studies for similar purposes.

Burma
Since the feudal states of the third century BC, the diverse people of Myanma pyi enjoyed an existence of local government and small villages. It was not until the 11th century AD that the ambition to politically unify Burma began to develop. Yet, even with the emergence of the Pagan Empire under Anawrahta, and the empires to follow, the Burman kings only loosely organized the minority populations into a cohesive political whole. Ethic factions such as the Karens, Kachin, Shan, Mons and Arakanese might have paid tribute to the Burmese ruling class, and while it’s true that these diverse ethnics populations often benefited from the advance of civilization that ensued, the existence of empire levied very little impact on the day to day operations of local government, culture or religion as assimilation, not annihilation, was the dominant practice. This is primarily due to the priority that was placed on people versus land or territory. The area was sparsely populated, and conquest was more often than not, simply a shifting of leadership.

Beginning with British colonization, however, and continuing through to modern-day, attempts at superimposing an artificial construct of national unity with a centralized government have been forced, frustrated, and destined for failure. Charismatic figures such as Aung San, U Nu and Ne Win have each risen from the ruins, each with their own unique approach toward national unity, and each failing to achieve it. The respective failure of imperialism, socialism and militant totalitarianism to create a truly cohesive polity, conducive to economic development and stability in Burma, smacks of communism’s great shortcomings in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Today’s complex global economy demands greater efficiency and much more open trade relations than Burma’s 20th century system of government can possible offer. The very “glue” that now imprisons the diverse people of Burma together as a nation is also an oppressive political catalyst fomenting fragmentation and cultural independence.

Michael Aung-Thwin rightly claims that indigenous pacification was tied into a complex socioeconomic and religious system that the people understood and accepted, while the British pacification was centered on “two primary criteria: the absence of significant military resistance” and “the existence of a successfully administered territory, defined largely in terms of revenue collection.” Clearly the British approach to pacification in Burma was crude, inferior and oversimplified in comparison to the indigenous approach, because the British largely did not understand, nor did they particularly care to understand, local socioeconomic and religious mores that governed pre-colonial Burma. The British were there primarily for spices and teak, they cared little about the rest. The British had no intention of engaging the Burmese people on an equal plane of respect and mutual equity, this was an exploitative relationship. The British were there to exploit the natural and human resources, nothing more.

With 135 distinct ethnic groups in its population today, Burma’s history is both fascinating and complicated. However certain trends do tend to surface over and over in the history of this troubled region. In our quest for identifiable patterns, it makes sense to start at the beginning. As we take this journey into Burma’s war-torn past, we will begin to notice the contradictory yet compelling cycles of conquest and defeat that continue to repeat themselves in this ancient land embracing Theravada Buddhism, peace and the quest for harmony, both among the multi-cultural people within its borders and toward the nations without.

There are a number of sources from which one can find a sketching of the basics of Burmese history. I have relied predominantly on Burma by D.G.E Hall, History of Burma by G.E. Harvey, History of Burma by Arthur P. Phayre, A Pageant of Burmese History by W.S. Desai, and Burma by F.S.V. Donnison. I have also consulted Totalitarianism in Burma by Mya Maung for its social commentary on Ne Win's rule, “Burmese Socialism: Economic Problems of the First Decade” by Laurence D. Stifel for its discussion of the economic conditions under Ne Win, and “The Burmese Ways to Socialism” by Maureen Aung-Thwin and Thant Myint-U for its discussion of the history of Burma under Ne Win.

It is difficult to speculate exactly when it was that people began to settle in this region. Harvey suggests that the earliest inhabitants may have come from Indonesia, but left very little evidence of their existence. These early inhabitants were displaced by the Mon and the Tibeto-Burman tribes, Mongolian people from eastern Tibet and Western China who, for centuries, migrated south into the region. Exact dates and routes are, of course, impossible to pinpoint. But Harvey paints us a vivid mental picture of “tribe after tribe of hungry yellow men with the dust of the world’s end upon their feet, seeking food and warmth in tiny homesteads along the fertile river banks, seeking that place in the sun which has been the dream of the northern races in so many ages....These races came, owing to causes such as drought and ethnic pressure, in successive infiltrations, each driving its predecessor farther south.”

This depiction of early Burma as a land of freedom and opportunity is elaborated on by Desai: “The country was indeed very rich in mineral and other resources...oil, rubies, silver, lead, tin, woolfram...elephants, tigers, and...lions...” Desai also tells us that there “was a complete absence of organized government; also the rule of one man over a large area was neither present nor practicable.” There were, of course, centers of local government such as the Mon settlements of Thaton, Pegu, Rangoon and Twante; the Arkanese settlements of Vesali and Sandoway; the Shan settlement of Tagaung; and the Pyu settlements of Prome, Powndaung, Halin, Peikthano and Nyaunglun. These early political centers, while completely independent of one another, became interconnected through trade, war and migration. They gradually developed commonalities, such as the tradition of the eldest daughter not marrying, so that in the event of defeat in war, she could be offered as tribute to the conquering king (again, supporting a policy of assimilation rather than one of annihilation).

These shared traditions and mores can be traced back to the early influence of Theravada Buddhism. The preponderance of the earliest written records have been destroyed, however, according to the Talaing chronicles Buddhist monks came in the second century BC. After being “violently opposed” by the local inhabitants, their teachings gradually took root. Subsequently, the diverse people living in this area developed a common civilization strongly influenced by Indian culture and, of course, Theravada Buddhism. This shared civilization, while offering the “meaning” of which Aung-Thwin argues was missing in the British pacification, also celebrated the unique and diverse people it united.

The shared civilization enjoyed by the inhabitants of ancient Burma developed over centuries of migration. By the first century BC, the Pyu were arriving and setting up city kingdoms. Much of what we know about the Pyu comes from Chinese sources as this region was situated on a trade route between China and India. The sources indicate that the Pyu were peace-loving Theravada Buddhists that controlled eighteen kingdoms including Halingyi, Binnaka, Sri Ksetra, Mongamo and Peikthanomyo. The largest and strongest was Sri Ksetra (in fact, archeologists suggest it is perhaps the largest city ever built in Burma). And while there is no evidence that the cities ever combined their strengths to create a consolidated kingdom, the smaller cities are believed to have paid tribute to the larger, with Sri Ksetra serving loosely as a capital until somewhere around 656 AD. The Pyu fell to the kingdom of Nanzhao in 832 AD, opening the way for the Burman, who migrated into the area from the north and constructed the famous Pagan Kingdom.

Pagan grew very powerful, and in 1057, King Anawrahta conquered the Mon city of Thaton and unified the entire region, creating the First Burmese Empire and attaining the status of Min Laung. Anawrahta’s successful unification of Burma, while being the decisive factor in attaining Min Laung status, is by no means the only factor. Anawrahta was deeply spiritual and brought the Mon form of Buddhism, along with its holy books, to Pagan. He also imported many of the Mon (including the entire royal court), assimilating their creative abilities, their culture, architecture, and in short, their culture into that of Pagan; making him truly a beloved monarch, rather than just an oppressive dictator. Anawrahta also performed countless acts of merit- making, including the building of many of the most beautiful pagodas in Burma.

Under Anawrahta, the people created and enjoyed a shared civilization with the very “meaning” that Aung-Thwin mourns in the colonial period. The Pagan Kingdom continued for more than two centuries until its demise in 1287 at the hands of the Mongols during the reign of Pagan’s last king. King Narathihapte (1254-87) “was the typical eastern despot of fiction, without any of the redeeming features of his predecessors. He showed no zeal for religion, and his arbitrary and brutal behavior caused his vassals to revolt. The pompous hyperbole of the inscription with which he dedicated the Mingalazedi Pagoda, stands out in sharp contrast to the genuine devotion and literary refinement which characterize those of his predecessors. In it he is styled ‘the supreme commander of a vast army of thirty-six million soldiers, the swallower of three hundred dishes of curry daily.”

Narathihapte was not the true heir to the throne (his mother was a concubine). His half brother, Thingathu, was the son of a queen and true heir to the throne (Burmese laws of succession dictated that the king must be the son of a queen). But the chief minister, Yazathinkyan, was opposed to making Thingathu king because years earlier, Thingathu had spit betel juice on him for not offering the proper respect (Yazathinkyan had not seen him). At a large meeting of ministers and chief headmen, it was reasoned that if this was how Thingathu acted as a prince, what would he be like as king? So they made the sixteen-year-old Narathihapte king in his stead (no doubt, thinking that they would have greater control over him). Narathahapte proved, instead, to be out of control. He burnt one of his queens alive for attempting to poison him. He also locked his sons inside the palace to prevent them from rebelling. To be fair, however, Narathihapte cannot be totally blamed for the demise of Pagan. Attacks by both the Tartars and the Shan proved to be too much for even the once great Pagan kingdom to sustain.

After the Mongol invasion, the Tartars eventually withdrew to China, leaving the land to the Shan. Chaos was the law of the land. But by 1364, Pagan culture resurfaced in the Ava Dynasty to the north as the Shan borrowed largely from the Burmese culture. Ava became the political center of the north and controlled the vitally important rice harvests in the Kyaukse region. The Shan’s bitter enemies, the Mon, reigned in Pegu to the south, which was growing into an established commercial and religious center. Thus was the polarization of Burma for most of its pre-colonial history. The two were locked in a state of perpetual warfare until the fall of Ava to the Mon in 1752.

Meanwhile King Minkyinyo (1486-1531) had established the First Toungoo Dynasty in 1486. Minkyiniyo captured Kyaukse and greatly paved the way for his son, Tabishweti
(1531-50) to enter into a campaign of expansion. With control of the rice economy, Toungoo quickly became a strong central polity and Tabinshwehti successfully brought unification to a substantial portion of the region. Due to increased European trade in the region, Burma’s prestige as a center of trade returned. Tabinshwehti, taking advantage of Pegu’s commercial prominence, took Pegu and made it his new capital city. Toward the end of his reign, however, Tabishweti’s power began to wane substantially after two failed attacks on Siam. The Mons reclaimed Pegu, and the Shan recovered much of the territory they had lost to Toungoo. The city of Toungoo lay to the south of Ava, and a large population of Burmans relocated to Toungoo after the Shan re-invaded their homes. Tabinshwehti’s brother-in-law, Bayinnaung (1550-1581), took the throne in 1550. Under Bayinnaung, Toungoo once again dominated the region. Bayinnaung recaptured Pegu, all the land that Tabinshweti had lost to the Shan, conquered Ava and led Toungoo warriors in several victories campaigns against Siam. Bayinnaung successfully established the Second Burmese Empire. Hall tells us that “Bayinnaung treated the Mons with great respect.”

It can truly be said that Bayinnaung was a true Min Laung. The people viewed him as a great king, not only for his leadership, but also for his merit-making. He is known to have used the jewels from his own crown to “adorn the spire of a pagoda.” Both an able warrior and statesmen, and a spiritual leader, Bayinnaung had large numbers of Burmans flocking to him in an effort to escape persecution. As a warrior king, he protected his borders from enemy invasion. He never had to close off his borders to keep his own people from fleeing to other lands. Bayinnaung has been called “the most remarkable leader produced by Burma.”

Thohanbwa (1527-43) reigned in Ava after his father, Sawlon of Mohnyin took Ava in 1527. “Thohanbwa was a full-blooded savage.” He hated the Burmese race and many of the nobles and men of position fled to Bayinnaung in Tangoo, “which had become a place of refuge for those who were determined not to submit to Shan domination.” Thohanbwa is noted for having said “Burmese pagodas have nothing to do with religion. They are simply treasure chambers.” He was known for helping himself to their treasure. Naturally, the monks resisted. Thohanbwa reasoned that the monks were a problem. He’s recorded as having said: “Monks surround themselves with followers and could rebel if they like. They should be killed.” Consequently, in 1540, Thohanbwa prepared a great feast for the monks. When the monks arrived, he surrounded them with his men and slaughtered them. He then burnt all the manuscripts from the monasteries. Of some 1,300 monks in his region, he killed 360. The rest took refuge with Bayinnaung. Thohanbwa was betrayed and killed by his chief officer, Minkyiyanaung, a Burman.

Aung-Thwin has called the sangha “a balance to the political extremism of the state,” and has clearly stated that “it was the duty of the king” to preserve the purity of the sangha through “sasana reform.” Put simply, sasana reform entailed the cleansing of the sangha via the removing, or taking back, of lands and wealth that were given to the sangha through merit-making. This usually also included the reduction and re-qualifying of the monk-hood. Aung-Thwin argues that this cyclical process of reform safeguarded the economic prosperity of the kingdom by preventing the tax-exempt status and wealth of the sangha from overly draining the throne. Since merit-making itself was also seen as necessary for the prosperity of the kingdom, it was not long before the sangha once again grew very rich through this practice. Hence, the periodic cleansing of the sangha helped to continually restore the economic balance and was seen as a powerful way to return the sangha to a state of simplicity and non-worldliness.

Bayinnaung died in 1581. He was sixty-six years old and had ninety-seven children. Harvey tells us that “his life was the greatest explosion of human energy ever seen in Burma.” In addition to the great kingdom that he amassed, he had also rebuilt Pegu after the Mons burnt it to the ground in 1564 when he was on a military campaign against Siam. This city was the jewel of his kingdom. It was a walled city containing his magnificent palace and four white elephants.

According to Aung-Thwin, implicit in the role of sasana reform was the belief that the wealth and prosperity of a kingdom was a direct correlation of the spiritual greatness of its king. Accordingly, Burma’s prosperity under Bayinnaung was yet another symbol of his greatness.

Bayinnaung was succeeded by his son Nandabayin (1581-99). Nandabayin was a tyrant. He lacked the charisma of his father as well as the support of the people. Rather than serve the people, he chose to enslave, oppress and slaughter them. He enslaved the Talaings (Mon) to work in his rice fields, branded them and then forced them to buy rice only from him. Those that were too old or weak, he traded for horses. Since thousands joined the sangha just to avoid service to him, Nandabayin turned his fury upon the Talaing monks, exiling them and replacing them with his own appointees, many of whom were spies. Nandabayin “instituted a reign of terror among the Talaings, executing them wholesale.”

Multiple rebellions by ethic minorities combined with his campaigns in Siam were whittling away at Nandabayin’s military might and manpower for agriculture. There simply weren’t enough resources to go around. By 1599, Bayinnaung’s kingdom was all but the remainder of its parts. A joint Toungoo-Arakanese seige, led by Nandabayin’s cousin, proved to be the end. Nandabayin surrendered to his cousin and was murdered. Bayinnaung’s palace was burned to the ground. By 1613, Anaukpetlun (Bayinnaung’s grandson), had been successful in reuniting Burma and in thwarting Portuguese designs on the country. He had moved his capital to Pegu. In 1628 he was murdered in his sleep by his son Minredeippa, who had committed treason by sleeping with one of his father’s concubines. Fearing execution, he attempted to escape judgment by slaying his father. He was executed anyway by the council of ministers.

Anaukpetliun’s successor, Thalun (1629-48), ruled in the flavor of Pagan. During his coronation the Mons in Pegu rebelled. They were put down and many fled to Siam. Since Pegu was mainly used as a based from which to attack Siam, Thalun moved his capital to Ava and pursued a policy of peace and stability over war and dissension. Like Pagan of old, the kingdom fell into a slow decline through overspending on the sangha. It was during Thalun’s reign that the Dutch and the English East India Companies were allowed to open their first factories. The remaining years of the dynasty were wrought with decline. Ming invaders raised havoc as they sporadically raided Burmese territory after being driven out in 1644 by the Manchus following the Chinese civil war. Finally, in April 1752, a Mon invasion captured the city of Ava, burnt it to the ground, and deported the royal family to Pegu.

By 1753, a new and improved Burman dynasty appeared, the Konbaung Dynasty. Ruled by Alaungpaya, the Kongbaung Dynasty reclaimed the northern regions from the Mon and in 1759 took back Pegu. Many of the Mon were wiped out or forced to flee to Siam. (The Mon remain a persecuted people in Burma to this day). Alaungpaya set up his capital in Rangoon, unifying “the river land plains and delta towns for the first time.” Alaungpaya created the Third Burmese Empire, and for that he is credited with the status of a Min Laung.

The following decade witnessed Konbaung victories over Ayutthaya, and even Chinese military advances were quashed. But the British in India grew weary of the ever-increasing Burmese expansion. In 1824, the British and Siamese coordinated their efforts against Myanmar. The First Anglo-Burmese War, ending in 1826 with the Treaty of Yandaboo, spelled a decisive victory for the British, who soon became hungry for more. In 1852, under the pretense of (some very minor) treaty violations, the British initiated the Second Anglo-Burmese War. The British took control of Pegu for its commercial interests and renamed the region Lower Burma. Revolution broke out in Myanmar, and King Pagan Min was succeeded by Mindon Min, his half-brother. Attempts to stunt the increased British occupation of the country proved insufficient. The British again provoked hostilities, this time under the pretense that King Mindon’s son, Thibaw Min, planned to side with the French. The Third Anglo-Burmese War resulted in all of Burma becoming a British colony in 1886.

Pockets of resistance held on until around 1896 when the British finally stamped out rebellion with a stratagem that often involved the razing of entire villages. Standard colonial fare followed the British occupation: fall of the monarchy, separation of church and state, rape and plunder of the land and resources and the introduction of a monetary economy. With the opening of the Suez canal came an increased demand for rice from Burma. Huge areas of land were earmarked for cultivation, but in order to cultivate it, the poor Burmese farmers had to borrow money at excessive interest. Many eventually lost their land when they couldn’t pay their debts. Thus, while rice production soared, the wealth was restricted to a small elite group of foreign investors. Even most of the labor was imported from India, so entire villages of Burmese found themselves unemployed.

Conditions worsened until the 1920's when some limited reform occurred and a university was established. In the early 1930's, Saya San led a nation insurrection against the British. This was the beginning of the end for the British in Burma. Although the rebellion was put down within two years, it led to the emergence of other national leaders in Burma. The university was also now producing a generation of educated Burmese students, many of whom rallied under the Thakin Movement (Thakin is a Burmese word, roughly translated as “master.” It is the name by which students were required to address their British instructors). The Thakin Movement staged a strike in 1936, drawing the attention of Thakin Nu and Aung San, who joined the movement. The unrest gained momentum, and by 1937, Burma became separate from India with its own fully elected assembly, a prime minister and a new constitution. Independence, however, was not in the immediate forecast. It wasn’t until 1948 (after WWII, after the Japanese occupation of Burma, after the Burmese themselves were greatly responsible for ejecting the Japanese from Burma, and after the British returned in an attempt to “lord it over” the Burmese once again) that the Burmese finally won their independence.

“Independence” is an ironic term, however. April 1947 saw the election of Aung San and his Anti-Fascist Freedom People’s League (AFPFL). But Aung San was assassinated on July 19 of the same year, and the AFPFL quickly broke into its constituent parts. The civil war that followed further demonstrated the lack of any remote unity in Burma, as Socialists (PYA), White Flag Communists, Red Flag Communists, Arakanese Muslims, Karens and a host of other divergent political groups vied for independence and control. Prime minister U Nu was ineffective at best in these early years. In 1948 the army split in two, one half headed by Ne Win, the other half rebelled. By 1949, Ne Win had taken total control of the army and socialized it. Nine years later, Ne Win was asked to fix the nation. U Nu asked Ne Win to step in as interim prime minister when the AFPFL split in October 1958. Ne Win “stabilized” the political climate and in February 1960, elections were held, and U Nu was again back in the office of prime minister.

It didn’t take long for Burma to evolve into its present-day form. Ne Win overthrew U Nu on March 2, 1962 and began a ruthless campaign known as the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” One of his earliest acts to “restore order” was the murder of nearly 100 unarmed student protestors on July 7, 1962 at the Rangoon University Student Union (RUSU). The next day, the RUSU was destroyed with dynamite and Ne Win delivered his now infamous “sword with sword, spear with spear” speech, in which he promised to fight force with force. (He apparently had no problem using force to combat most any obstacle). Student protests continued (1965, 1969, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1987), universities were temporarily closed down and unrest fermented. In June of 1974 a large labor strike was put down with violence. And, of course, there was the tragic “Four Eights Uprising” in 1988 in which thousands were murdered in the streets. Ne Win’s public stranglehold on the people continued until his resignation as chairman of the ruling party on July 23, 1988 (he had stepped down as president in 1981, but continued to run the nation as chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, the only political party allowed to legally operate in Burma). However, it is widely suspected that Ne Win continued to exert his influence from behind the scenes.

Ne Win’s policy of isolation, combined with the nationalizing of the economy, drove Burma to the brink of ruin (in spite of the economic reforms that came in 1987-88, too little, too late). As Ne Win promised in his farewell address, the army would use force without mercy to crush insurrection. Roughly a month later it did just that. The 8888 uprising between August 8-12 and again on September 18 not only brought Ne Win’s threat to fruition, but ushered in yet another oppressive regime. On September 18, 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) headed by General Saw Maung, which had just brutally slaughtered thousands of its own people, took the country by force. A sort of “New Jack” government that continues to run the country to this day. The constitution was replaced with martial law and the name of the country was changed to Myanmar.

Saw Maung, bowing to outside international pressure, made a show economic and political reform. In 1990, a bogus election was held, in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) clearly won. The party’s leaders, U Tin U and Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of Aung San), remained under house arrest. The military refused to relinquish control of the government. Increased political pressure, along with economic sanctions, led to yet another coup in which General Than Shwe took control and remains in power today. SLORC was officially replaced by SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) in 1997, but remains essentially the same entity. Human rights violations continue to be a major concern, and sanctions against Myanmar continue to this day.

This thick description offers us an insight into the Burmese dilemma. The constructive sovereignty model predicts that the more international a domestic population begins, the more the state will reflect those preferences and embed international norms. The model also assumes a causal relationship between domestic preferences and a state’s foreign policy. In the case of Burma, the ethnic fragmentation has led to a cycle of forced unity and subjugation. This cycle exists today in contemporary Burma with the majority literally held captive by the ethnic Burmese minority. Because of this anomaly, Burma itself is isolated from most of the international community. Rather than allowing for the internationalization of the domestic population, the junta has sealed the state from outside influences and placed an iron yoke on the people in an effort to quash diversity. Hence the domestic preferences of a small ethnic minority in Burma have been militarily imposed upon the rest of the population. This domestic policy has directly shaped Burma’s foreign policy to the rest of the world.

The situation in Burma today allows us to control for the key variable in the constructive sovereignty model, the internationalization of the domestic population. Whether one attributes this internationalization process to immigration, open trade, media influences or multinational corporations, Burma allows us to effectively control for this causal mechanism because the process has not taken place in Burma due to the harsh repression of the junta.

Thailand

“The Thai people are the product of a synthesis of a wide array of cultures, especially Chinese and Indian, that during various historical eras have blended in a unique manner.”

The kingdom of Nanchao in South China is the oldest recorded Thai state. After resisting Chinese assaults for 300 years, followed by another several hundred years of vassalage to the Chinese empire, it was destroyed in 1253 by Kublai Khan. The Thai migrated south, captured the Khmer imperial garrison at Sukhothai and established a new kingdom. During the Sukhothai era (1238-1350), the absolute monarch ruled as a father over his children. After the death of Rama the Great, the Sukhothai kingdom began to disintegrate, and eventually fell to Utong who moved the capital to Ayudhya. Under King Rama Tibodi I a massive modernization and expansion was undertaken which involved the conquest of the neighboring Khmer empire and the subsequent transformation of the Thai monarch from loving father of the people to the Brahman semi-divinity. This transformation is exemplary of the Thai tradition of co-opting its enemies and assimilating them into Thai society. King Rama Tibodi I also incorporated many Khmer administrative practices into the Thai bureaucracy. After two hundred years of war, Ayudhya was destroyed by Burma in 1767. From the ashes of defeat, a new empire rose up in Bangkok, the Chakri dynasty. This dynasty would again demonstrate the Thai tradition of assimilation and cooption as it faced the French on one border and the British on the other.

Thailand’s history was in many respects very similar to that of Burma’s up to the period of Burma’s colonization by the British. Both were predominantly rural with sparsely inhabited land; both were heavily influenced by the Buddhist institution of merit making; and of course, since both states shared long centuries of war with one another, their common border also served as a point of cultural exchange. Fred Riggs further elaborates on the two states common heritage, both receiving their language base primarily from China, their political and administrative culture from Brahman India, and their styles of monarchy were both greatly influenced by Theravada Buddhism. Riggs contends that it was essentially the ability of the Thai monarchy to modernize, and the inability of the Burmese monarchy to modernize, that established the distinct and separate paths that would take the two neighbors to their respective places in the world today. Both states shared the same cultural, geographic, and historical legacies. With the introduction of the European powers they would share yet another legacy, exposure to the international system.

Ultimately, the crucial juncture came for both states with the willingness of the Thai monarchy to concede land to the French and British on the one hand, and the Burmese monarchy’s ultimate demise after the Anglo-Burmese wars on the other. The difference can be summed up in the Thai monarchy’s willingness, in a sense, to co-opt the western powers, much as it had traditionally done throughout its history and as it continues to do to this day. The Burmese monarchy, however, was not willing to co-opt the British, nor has the Burmese ruling class been willing to share power since. This, of course, is a simplification as is any attempt to generalize between cases. For the purposes of this study, however, such a simplification is useful.

Conclusion

When we compare the cases of Thailand and Burma we find an overall trend of Thailand’s growing openness to the international community, and Burma’s growing isolation. John Sidel argues that the states’ distinct approaches toward Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth century greatly impacted the prospects for a middle class. Sidel points out that while Thailand pursued a policy of assimilation which led to the rise of a Chinese middle class, Burma pursued a policy of segregation which prevented a strong middle class from taking root. Many others such as David Wyatt claim that the overthrow of the absolute monarchy ultimately set the stage for a thriving bourgeoisie in Thailand. Wyatt traces the overthrow of the absolute monarchy back to the royal family’s consolidation of power during the reigns of Mongkut (1851-68) and Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), and the ultimate dissatisfaction the royal family’s monopoly of the best positions bred among the remaining elite in Thailand. Thawatt Mokorapong contends it was the spirit of nationalism, fostered by the continued policy of modernization during the reign of Vajravudh (1910-1925) that led to the downfall of the absolute monarchy and the rise of the middle class in Thailand.

However, this difference between the two states cannot be explained by the impact of colonization on Burma or the various ways that the two states assimilated Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth century. Nor can it be attributed to the subsequent appearance (or lack) of a middle class, for these are dependent variables. If one looks closely, all of these factors are results of, not causes of, a more fundamental distinction between the two states.

While it is true that Thailand was not colonized, this fact is due to the consolidation and integration of the Thai people under Rama V’s reforms. If colonization alone offered a substantial explanation for the differences between Thailand and Burma, how does one account for the fact that Thailand actually resembled Burma under British colonization much more than it does now? Also, how does one account for the vast difference between Burma and other former British colonies? Furthermore, the fact that Thailand assimilated the Chinese while in Burma the Chinese remained segregated is also the product of a more fundamental societal difference between the two states. Again, one must take the comparison a step further and ask why Burma is today so different from the other states that Sidel mentions that also segregated the Chinese and hence, stunted the development of a bourgeois middle class? None of the above mentioned “explanations” actually explain this fundamental difference; they simply describe external manifestations of this difference.

The pertinent factor in this study is that Thailand did integrate its various ethnic populations into a more internationalized body while in Burma; a militant minority subjugated the remaining ethnic factions leaving the state fragmented and stagnant. While ethnic integration in Thailand allowed for more openness toward the international community via media, trade, immigration, foreign investment, development loans through the IMF, and assistance from the United States and the World Bank; the brutal oppression and human rights violations in Burma led to a closed foreign policy and the isolation of Burma from virtually the rest of the world, with few exceptions.

The constructive sovereignty model allows for thick description as well as offering a generalizable theory. While the focus of this study is not to explain why the fundamental difference exists between Thailand and Burma (I will leave that to the sociologists), the constructive sovereignty model allows social scientists to control for the one independent variable that truly distinguishes Thailand from Burma: the degree of internationalization of their respective domestic populations. This one independent factor serves to explain the different domestic preferences and consequent foreign policies of the two states, describe the important differences between the two, and predict their future foreign policy preferences.

The more international Thailand’s domestic population continues to become, the more open its foreign policy will be, and the more integrated it will become within the international community. This integration will further expose the domestic Thai population to prevailing international norms and perpetuating the cycle. In contrast, the more tightly the junta in Burma clings to military control and subjugation of its domestic population, the more isolated it will require that population to be in order to maintain dominance. This, of course, is extremely problematic in today’s international economy. However, as long as Burma’s junta can continue to operate its lucrative drug trade and depend on China for outside assistance, it can continue much as it is today for some time in the future. Only time will tell what unforeseen forces will shake it from its current isolation.


Notes

1 Maszka, John. 2008. “Constructive Sovereignty: A New Model for an Old Problem.” Strategic Insights, Fall. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2008/Sep/maszkaSep08.pdf.

2 Normatively, I would add that to the extent that this is the case, the sovereignty of such a state should be respected by other states and by the international community as a whole.

3 Mya Maung, Totalitarianism in Burma: Prospects for Economic Development (Paragon House, New York, 1992) p. 3. Anawrahta is also called Anoryahtah or Aniruddha.

4 Michael Aung-Thwin, “The British ‘Pacification’ of Burma: Order without Meaning,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 16.2 (1985): 245-61.

5 Ibid., 246.

6 D.G.E. Hall, Burma (Hutchinson House, London, 1950). This relatively short work is amazingly rich with small details. Hall dedicates roughly half of his pages solely to internal Burmese history, with only a brief reference to European trade, before turning his attention to the British “residency” (p.106). Herein lays the primary flaw in Hall’s scholarship: his perspective is clearly western and pro-British. Hall ends his book by mourning Burma’s unwise decision to leave the British Commonwealth and insisting that Britain only wanted Burma’s “friendship” (p.176). Beyond that, the book is an enjoyable read that presents the major issues in a very direct and concise (if not at times somewhat one-sided) manner.

7 G.E. Harvey, History of Burma: From the Earliest Beginnings to 10 March 1824; The Beginning of the English Conquest (Octagon, New York, 1925). Harvey’s work is by far the most comprehensive in this bibliography, ranging from pre-history to 1824. In this sense, it is also the most “historical” in that it provides the most information. Harvey’s approach is less biased than Donnison’s yet it has the some of the storytelling quality of Desai’s. Harvey’s History of Burma was absolutely indispensable to this study in that it offered the detail that was absent in the others.

8 Arthur P. Phayre, History of Burma (Trubner & Co., London, 1883). Phayre’s work, of course, is a must in any bibliography dealing with Burmese history. Phayre’s approach, perhaps not unlike that of the British in Burma, is detached and impersonal. Phayre reads much like so many pages of dry laboratory notes. When reading this book, one is always aware of the distinct sense of otherness, as if observing through a window. There is nothing engaging about this book, nothing that draws you in, nothing intimate. Phayre’s work, more than anything, exists in this bibliography as an example of the “order without meaning” that Michael Aung-Thwin mourns in “The British ‘Pacification’ of Burma: Order Without Meaning.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 16.2 (1985): 245-61.

9 W.S. Desai, A Pageant of Burmese History (Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1961). Desai’s account of the history of Burma ranges from pre-history to 1960 with the election of U NU and the resignation of Ne Win. It ends with, what today could be viewed as, a rather naive sigh of relief that Ne Win didn’t usurp control and establish a dictatorship. But this is exactly why I was drawn to this book, it has a very human element that the other history texts lacked. From its descriptions of the physical geography to its detailed handling of the personalities of its monarchs, one gets the sense that Desai witnessed it first hand. In this, Desai has captured the essence of the Burmese people. In addition to the many who, what, where, when and how explanations he offers in this book, he has answered many of the “why” questions of particular interest to a study of this nature.

10 F.S.V. Donnison, Burma (Praeger, New York, 1970). Donnison offers a very brief sketch of the history of Burma prior to its annexation by the Brittish, but his primary focus is the period between Burma’s annexation by the British and 1969. Donnison’s explanations of the events in Burmese history tend to incorporate the international political climate as much, if not more than, Burma’s own domestic political climate. For example: on page 162 Donnison’s briefly credits Ne Win’s coup in 1962 as an attempt to thwart U.S plans to use Burmese soil as a vantage ground from which to attack communist China. Donnison’s work is useful to this study in that it places Burma’s political turmoil within the context of the contemporary worldwide political arena.

11 Maung, Totalitarianism in Burma: Prospects for Economic Development.
Stifel, “Burmese Socialism: Economic Problems of the First Decade.” Stifel addresses the high hopes of the business community of Burma were dashed after the revolutionary socialist government did not turn out to be what they expected. Stifel analyses the economic policies of the decade following the coup of 1962, searching for a ways to quantify Burma’s economic goals. Stifel looks primarily at the rice economy, and lays out 4 objectives: nationalism of the economy, reduced dependence on foreign markets, a more diversified industrial base, and complete centralization of the economy. After a brief overview of the economic roller coaster ride of imprisoned businessmen and “embarrassing failures,” Stifel offers an honest assessment of the overall success of the government in achieving these four goals in the first decade.

12 Aung-Thwin and Myint-U, “The Burmese Ways to Socialism.” This article addresses the many obstacles that the Burmese government faced under the first the British and then their own brand of Buddhist Socialism. It traces U Nu’s efforts to obtain national unity and economic stability through a planned economy. The article discusses U Nu’s ultimate failure, Ne Win’s rise to power, the introduction of Military Socialism, and the temporary economic strength of the 1970's. It also very briefly touches on the 1988 Rebellion and its impact on the Burmese political economy. Finally, in the conclusion, there is a reference to Michael Aung-Thwin’s argument regarding Ne Win: “Indeed, Some Burma scholars have suggested that Ne Win’s coup of 1962 brought the country closer to its traditions and should be regarded as the real point of independence from foreign exploitation.”

13 Harvey, History of Burma, 3-4. Harvey refers to these early inhabitants of Burma by their traditional names: Pyu, Kanran and Thet. Harvey also suggests that the Karens may have, in fact, been the earliest settlers in the region. However, due to the absence of written records, historians can only speculate.

14 Desai, A Pageant of Burmese History, 1, 5-6.

15 Phayre, History of Burma, 26-27.

16 Hall, Burma, 7-8. Phayre, History of Burma, 17-32. Donnison, Burma, 49.

17 Donnison, Burma, 30.

18 Hall, Burma, 24.

19 Harvey, History of Burma, 16-38, 74. See also Donnison, Burma, 49-53.

20 Phayre, History of Burma, 92. Phayre refers to Minkyinyo as “ Meng Kyinyo.”

21 Donnison, Burma, 52-53.

22 Hall, Burma, 46.

23 Harvey, History of Burma, 172.

24 Donnison, Burma, 52.

25 Harvey, History of Burma, 107. In 1533, Sawlon was murdered by his own men.

26 Ibid.

27 Phayre, History of Burma, 88.

28 Harvey, History of Burma, 107-08.

29 Aung- Thwin, “The British ‘Pacification’ of Burma: Order without Meaning,” 260.

30 Michael Aung-Thwin, “The Role of Sasana Reform in Burmese History: Economic Dimensions of a Religious Purification,” Journal of Asian Studies 38, no. 4 (1979):671-88.

31 Harvey, History of Burma, 174.

32 Hall, Burma, 45-6.

33 Aung- Thwin, “The British ‘Pacification’ of Burma: Order without Meaning,” 258.

34 Harvey, History of Burma, 180.

35 Harvey, History of Burma, 180-3.

36 Phayre, History of Burma, 90-148. Donnison, Burma, 54-55. Hall, Burma, 63-74. Harvey, History of Burma, 185-216.

37 I have to admit that Alaungpaya is my least favorite of the accepted Min Laung. Because of the severe persecution of the Mon, and no open repentance for his actions, I would have definitely denied him the status.

38 Skidmore, Karaoke Fascism, 1.

39 Harvey, History of Burma, 219-304. Hall, Burma, 78-146. Donnison, Burma, 55-62.

40 Desai, A Pageant of Burmese History, 244-9.

41 Donnison, Burma, 123-39.

42 Desai, A Pageant of Burmese History, 279-95.

43 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Burma,” 3. See also Maung, Totalitarianism in Burma: Prospects for Economic Development, 174-212.

44 Stifel, “Burmese Socialism: Economic Problems of the First Decade,”60-74.

45 Clark D. Neher. Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation. p. 3.

46 Daniel Wit. Thailand: Another Vietnam?

47 David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija. Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform, Reaction, Revolution.

48 Fred W. Riggs. Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity.

49 David A. Wilson. Politics in Thailand.

50 Sidel, John T. 2008. “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Revisited: Colonial State and Chinese Immigrant in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia.”

51 David K. Wyatt. “Family Politics in Nineteenth Century Thailand.”

52 Thawatt Mokarapong. “The causes of the Revolution.” In Clark D. Neher (Ed.), Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation. Schenkman Publishing Company: Cambridge
(1976):73-96.


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